Custody & Security

Summary

• Keys are generated in, and remain in, an air-gapped signing environment. The web application cannot spend from it.
• Movements require multi-signature authorisation. The threshold is described under multisig setup; one compromised credential is not sufficient alone.
• In a storage plan Qblockx has no standing ability to move your assets without your authorisation.
• Client assets are held at addresses derived from your own wallet, not in a pooled company balance.
• Value you deploy (mining, investments, card programme) is a claim on Qblockx and carries counterparty risk.
• No independent audit of these controls is published. Said plainly, not glossed.

Where keys live

Private key material is held in a signing environment with no inbound network exposure. There is no listening service for an off-box attacker to query and no route from the web tier into key storage. The only artefact that leaves is a signed transaction, which becomes public anyway when broadcast.

Keys are created in that environment at wallet setup, from a cryptographically secure entropy source, and are not transmitted to the connected layer afterwards. The connected layer stores public derivation information sufficient to compute receiving addresses and show balances. An address and a balance do not confer the ability to spend.

Facility and region. Access to the signing environment is restricted to named operators, logged, and separate from the credentials that administer the web application: an administrative password reveals the dashboard, not the keys.

Multisig setup

A threshold of distinct keys must sign before value leaves the cold layer. The purpose is narrow and specific: eliminate the single point of failure, so one lost device, one phished operator, or one dishonest employee cannot move assets alone.

For an individual wallet the signing set is 2 keys, 2 required (2-of-2): your authorised device or share, and the Qblockx co-signing key. Your half is what makes this self-custody; our half exists to make unilateral action by us impossible, not to make yours impossible. Because both are required, neither party can drain the balance alone while you hold your recovery material.

Higher tiers can require a second independent approver before a movement is accepted, taking the effective policy to 3-of-3. That is the setting to use when an account holds more than you would tolerate losing to one compromised laptop.

Who can move assets, and under what approval

This depends on one choice you make at setup, and it is the most consequential sentence on this page:

• You can. You authorise outbound transfers; nothing moves without a signature you caused.
• Qblockx cannot move assets unilaterally while you hold your recovery material offline. Our co-signing key is one half of a threshold, not the whole of it.
• Qblockx can suspend account access administratively, for instance during a fraud report. That pauses the interface, not on-chain funds you have already withdrawn, and is a further reason to keep recovery material off our systems.
• Fees are deducted as published in the fee schedule. That is the only deduction taken without a per-transaction instruction.

Segregation of client assets

Assets you deposit to a storage plan sit at addresses derived from your own wallet, not in a pooled company balance. That is the substantive difference between segregation and a custodial exchange: on a pooled platform your claim is an IOU against a shared pot, whereas here your claim is against an address whose spend condition includes your key.

Company operating funds are held separately from client assets and are not the source for client withdrawals; a withdrawal is funded from the client address it came from. If that arrangement changes, it changes here first and your plan's terms are restated rather than quietly amended.

What happens to client funds if Qblockx ceases operations

This question decides whether cold storage means anything, so it gets a direct answer rather than reassurance.

Assets in a storage plan: your recovery shares are sufficient to reconstruct your key and sweep the assets to any address you choose, using standard wallet software. What disappears is the service, not your ability to reach your assets. That is the entire purpose of the architecture, and why your backups must not live only with us.

Value deployed in a product: mining rewards, investment positions and card-programme balances are claims against Qblockx. If we cease trading those become claims in whatever process follows, alongside our other creditors. They are not swept by a recovery phrase.

Not in place: no published insurance policy, no compensation scheme, and no insolvency-remote structure. Assume none until one is documented with a policy number you can check.

Counterparty risk

Counterparty risk here means, precisely: the risk that Qblockx, the operator of this platform, is unable or unwilling to do what your arrangement with us requires. It is named rather than softened into "market risk", because market risk is your exposure to prices and counterparty risk is your exposure to us. They are different risks and only one of them is our problem.

The exposures, each with how it is mitigated:

• Qblockx solvency. Relevant to deployed value; not to assets resting at your own cold addresses. Mitigation: deployed value is disclosed as a claim on us before you commit, and storage is architected so the largest balance class does not depend on our solvency at all.
• Qblockx continuity. If we stop operating, self-custody recovery becomes the mechanism and your backups become the only thing between you and a loss. Mitigation: recovery uses standard wallet software and needs nothing from our servers, which is the property described under if we cease operations.
• Upstream issuers and networks. Bridged, wrapped or issuer-controlled assets carry that party's risk, not ours. Mitigation: named at the point of deposit; a bridged asset is disclosed as a claim on its issuer.
• Card programme partners. Virtual card balances and cashback follow the issuing bank's programme terms, which govern over our interface. Mitigation: the programme terms are disclosed as the governing document.
• Our own accuracy. The balances you see are computed by our ledger. Mitigation: a discrepancy we caused is resolved in your favour.

The residual, stated flatly: there is no third party standing behind this platform. No insurer, no compensation scheme, no supervisory regime. What protects stored assets is cryptography and your own backups, and what protects nothing else is our ability to pay. Sizing a deposit by that distinction is the rational response to this paragraph.

What evidences any of this

Architecture is a set of claims. The controls worth having are the ones a third party can confirm, so this lists what exists rather than what would reassure.

Independent audit of reserves and controls

Not in place. Everything on this page is self-described and we say so.

Qualified custody partner

Not in place. Everything on this page is self-described and we say so.

Registered entity and number

Qblockx Ltd

Company profile you can cross-reference

Not in place. Everything on this page is self-described and we say so.

If anything here is out of date, tell us at support@qblockx.com and we will fix it.